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MORTGAGEES IN POSSESSION
ELIMINATING FORECLOSURES AND RECEIVERSHIPS IN ILLINOIS

CHARLES S.

MACAULAY'

M

ORTGAGEES today, to a greater extent than at any
time in the past, are up against the question of
determining the better way to proceed in case of default
by the mortgagor. The orthodox method of procedure
in the past has been to commence foreclosure of the
mortgage and to endeavor to secure the appointment of
a receiver for the premises. During the last few years,
however, mortgagees have been more and more exercising their right to take possession of the mortgaged estate
in order to secure the fullest protection possible. Considerations underlying this change fully warrant it on
principle, and its practical value is readily apparent. In
the appointment of a receiver there is the delay of procuring authority to act which many times damages the
rights of the parties interested; the receiver is an officer
of the court and must have the sanction of a court order
for his every official act; in order that the receiver properly present the matter to the court, it is usually necessary for him to employ an attorney, with additional
heavy expense. Thus it will be seen that the additional
immediate expenses incident to a receivership, inefficiency and lack of interest of the receiver, and delay in
securing authority to act offer serious objections to receiverships.
A better method of procedure, in view of the foregoing
facts, would be for the mortgagee under the mortgage or
trust deed to take possession of the premises. This procedure has the sanction of the early common law and
has been recognized in Illinois. It has the advantages of
placing an interested party in possession of the premises
who is able to care for the property without petitioning
the court every time it is necessary to purchase a load of
1 Associate Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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coal or lease an apartment. Since unnecessary expenses
are thus eliminated, the proper share of the income from
the property is available to be applied on the debt,
thereby averting foreclosure proceedings.
In order to secure a more complete understanding of
the relationship existing between the mortgagor and the
mortgagee and their respective rights, it is advisable to
trace the historical development of the relationship. At
common law, a mortgage is defined as an estate created
by a conveyance, absolute in its form, but intended to
secure performance of some act, such as payment of
money, by the grantor or some other person. Such conveyance is to become void if the act is performed agreeably to the terms prescribed. 2 In Illinois a mortgage
has been defined as "any conveyance of an estate to
secure a debt or the performance of some act, such as the
payment of money or the furnishing of indemnity, subject to be defeated by the performance of the act agreed
to be done." '3
At common law, when the mortgage was executed, the
entire legal estate passed at once to the mortgagee, and
unless provided otherwise, the mortgagee could maintain ejectment either before or after default, treating the
mortgagor as a trespasser if the latter refused to yield
possession. If the mortgagor paid the money when due
by the terms of the mortgage, the mortgagee's estate at
once terminated and was forever gone. The mortgagor,
was thus by operation of law remitted to his former
estate. If the mortgagor failed to pay according to the
terms of the mortgage, the entire legal estate passed to
the mortgagee forever, the title becoming absolute and
the mortgagor4 ceasing to have any interest whatever in
the premises.
In equity a mortgage of lands is regarded as a mere
lien or security for the debt, the debt being considered
2

2 B1. Com. 157.

3 Fitch v. Wetherbee, 110 Ill.475.
4 Barrett et al. v. Hinckley, 124 IIl. 32; Jones, A Treatise on the
Law of Mortgages of Real Property (8th Ed.), sec. 868.
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as the principal thing and the mortgage as accessory
thereto. The debtor still has the right to redeem after
the breach of the condition at law. Until foreclosure,
the mortgagor, where equitable doctrines are followed,
continues to be the real owner of the fee. His equity
of redemption may be granted, devised, taken in execution, or may give rise to dower. It is regarded as the
real and beneficial estate tantamount to the fee at law. 5
The common law rule was originally in force in Illinois.
It was held that the mortgagee, as an incident to his
ownership in fee, could enter before condition broken or
bring ejectment unless the mortgage provided otherwise.6 This rule was so harsh and unjust that the equitable doctrine gained favor, and the common law was considerably modified.
It is a conceded fact that the equitable theory of a mortgage
has, in process of time, made

.

.

.

material encroachments

upon the legal theory which is now fully recognized in courts
of law. Thus, it is now the settled law that the mortgagor
or his assignee is the legal owner of the mortgaged estate, as
against all persons except the mortgagee or his assigns...

Courts of law now regard the title of a mortgagee in fee, in
the nature of a base or determinable fee. The term of itfs
existence is measured by that of the mortgage debt.

When

the latter is paid off, or becomes barred by the Statute of
Limitations, the mortgagee's title is extinguished by operation of law. . . . Hence the rule is well established at law
as it is in equity, that the debt is the principal thing and the

mortgage an incident.7
As a consequence of the trend above set out, it has
been repeatedly held by the courts of Illinois, that a
mortgagee is not entitled to take possession until there
has been a breach of condition." However, after breach
287.
5 Leonard v. City of Metropolis, 278 I.
6 Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510; Ortengren v. Rice, 104 1l. App.
428.
7 Barrett et al. v. Hinckley, 124 Ill. 32.
8 Kransz v. Uedelhofen, 193 Ill. 477; Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill.
510.
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of condition the mortgagee has the same right as at com-mon law to take possession.9 He may file a bill in chancery for a foreclosure and sale, maintain ejectment for
possession at law, proceed against the debtor personally,
or make peaceable entry. 10 He may, immediately upon
breach of condition, 1 bring his action in ejectment without giving any notice to the person in possession. An
agreement, however, between the mortgagor and the
mortgagee entitling the mortgagee to take possession
prior to default will be recognized by the courts. In
this connection, whenever the purpose and object of the
mortgage require possession to be given to a person who
is not entitled thereto by ordinary operation of law, such
12
agreement will be implied from these circumstances.
A greater proportion of the cases dealing with the
rights of mortgagors and mortgagees, arise out of the
old form of mortgages. There cannot be much doubt,
however, that they apply equally to the rights of the parties under a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage.
Within the limitations imposed by the mortgage or deed of
trust and with reference to the subject of the trust, he [the
trustee] may be said to represent both parties, but not in any
such sense as to have power to waive their rights or to bind
them by outside contracts. For some purposes, however, he
may represent either party. He is bound to protect and preserve the subject of the trust, being authorized for that purpose to invoke the aid of the courts in a proper case, and he
is not at liberty to deal with the property in such a manner
as to gain any advantage for himself at the cost of the grantor
or the beneficiary. . . . He is liable for any fraud or gross
negligence or abuse of discretionary powers, or if he wastes
9Rohrer v. Deatherage, 336 fll. 450.
10Vansant v. Allmon et al., 23 Ill. 26; Rohrer v. Deatherage, 336

Ill. 450.
11Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510; Barrett et al. v. Hinckley, 124
Ill. 32; Pollock et al. v. Matson et al., 41 Ill. 516; Jackson v. Warren,
32 Ill. 331; Carroll v. Ballance, 26 Ill. 9; Vansant v. Allmon et al.,
23 Ill. 26.
12 Tledeman, An Elementary Treatise on the American Law of
Real Property (3rd Ed.), sec. 244.
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or loses the property, or fails to apply it or its proceeds according to the directions of the deed.13
The legal title is vested in the trustee as in the mortgagee. 14 Until there has been a default in the securities
which are protected by the trust deed, he has no active
duties. But he must use every reasonable means to protect the note holders according to the tenor of the instrument under which he acts. The parties may generally limit the liability imposed upon the trustee, but
they cannot relieve him from a violation of his trust duty
for acts done fraudulently or with wilful and gross neg15
ligence.
A mortgagee may have the benefit of improvements
made by the mortgagor, and he may also claim the benefit of any subsequently acquired title. When the mortgagor in possession, or anyone claiming under him, is
about to commit waste to such an extent as may be calculated to render inadequate the security, the mortgagee
may procure a restraining injunction. However, if the
mortgagor has committed waste, the mortgagee may
have an action on the case for damages, may maintain
replevin for timber or fixtures removed from the premises, or may maintain an action for any part of the mortgaged estate wrongfully severed and converted into personalty. 16
Ordinarily, the mortgagee may not claim the benefits
of rents and income from the mortgaged premises until
he has gained actual possession of the premises or taken
an attornment from the lessee and accepted him as tenant. However, if the mortgage is so drawn as to pledge
the rents and profits specifically as security, they become
a primary security equally with the land, and the parties may agree that the mortgagee or trustee shall collect
41 C. J. 606, and cases there cited.
14 Ware v. Schintz, 190 Ill. 189.
15 Breed v. Baird, 139 Ill. App. 15; Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250
Fed. 321.
16 Dorr v. Dudderar, 88 fli. 107; Jones, A Treatise on the Law of
Mortgages of Real Property (8th Ed.), sec. 851.
13
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the same and apply them on the debt. Such a mortgage
does not interfere with the equity of redemption."
If the mortgagee is entitled to possession and brings
an action to recover it, the mortgagor cannot defend on
the ground that the mortgage was made in fraud of creditors. He cannot render his own conveyance of no force
and effect. If the mortgagor, or his grantee or assignee,
wrongfully refuses to surrender possession after demand, he is liable to the trustee in damages.
However, the mortgagee 's mere right of entry after
default does not of itself render the mortgagor liable
for rents and profits.' 8 So if the mortgagee wishes to
avail himself of the rents and profits of the premises he
will wish to take possession as soon as possible. Several
avenues are open by which the mortgagee may enforce
his right of entry.
As a usual thing, acquiring possession is not much of
a problem, because the mortgagor, to eliminate receiver's
fees and the expenses of a foreclosure, will readily yield
possession to the mortgagee. If the latter rightfully
gains possession after the debt accrues to him, he may
continue in possession until the obligation is fully satisfied. In these circumstances he may also hold possession of the premises against everyone unless he acts
fraudulently, is grossly incompetent or irresponsible,
commits waste, or misapplies the rents and profits. His
right to enter in any lawful manner may be presumed
from the mortgage itself when there is no agreement to
the contrary.'9
In Illinois, the legal title to the presises is vested in
the mortgagee after condition broken. The mortgagee
therefore has the immediate right, upon such breach, to
17 Bolton v. Starr, 223 Ill. App. 39; Townsend v. Wilson et al., 155
Ill. App. 303; Ortengren v. Rice, 104 Ill. App. 428; Forlouf v. Bowlin
et al., 29 Ill. App. 471; Oakford v. Robinson, 48 Ill. App. 270.
1s Forlouf v. Bowlin, 29 Ill. App. 471.
19 Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Mortgages of Real Property
(8th Ed.), sec. 715; Peterson v. Lindskoog, 93 Ill. App. 276; Dickason
v. Dawson, 85 Ill. 53; Nicholson v. Walker, 4 Ill. App. 404.
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bring ejectment against the mortgagor. The mortgagee
is also entitled to all the rights and remedies which the
law gives to the owner of the fee and all rights of the
20
mortgagor against the tenants.
In addition to the right of the mortgagee to obtain
possession of the premises by an action in ejectment, it
is possible that the action of forcible entry and detainer
may lie under the statutes as now provided. Since the
last amendment to the statute in 1881 there has been no
case directly in point covering the right to bring this
action by a mortgagee. Jones says:
This process is not applicable to the case of a mortgagee
who has attempted to take possession under a mortgage for a
breach of condition, and whose attempt has been repelled by
force. Nor can a grantee in a deed intended as a mortgage
maintain the action of forcible entry and detainer . ..
Neither a mortgagee who has not taken possession of the
mortgaged premises, nor a purchaser at a sale under the power,
can maintain this process for the purpose of obtaining possession of the property. The object of the statute is to give a
speedy remedy to those who, being in possession of land, are
unlawfully dispossessed by force, and not to permit questions
of title to be tried by a summary process before an inferior
21
tribunal.
However, it has been held that where a mortgagor who
gives a trust deed acknowledges that he is to be the
tenant of the trustee and covenants that an action of
forcible entry and detainer may be employed to dispossess him upon breach, if he fails to surrender possession immediately, such action will lie upon the happening of the contingency. 22 It is also true that under a
20Ladd v. Ladd, 252 Ill. 43; Rohrer v. Deatherage, 336 Ill. 450; In re
Petition of Chicago Trust Company, 264 Ill. App. 106; Ware v.
Schintz, 190 Ill. 189; Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510; Barrett v.
Hinckley, 124 11. 32; McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281; Oldham v.
Pfleger, 84 Ill. 102; Esker v. Hefferman, 195 U. S. 1.
21 Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Mortgages of Real Property
(8th Ed.), sec. 892, and cases there cited.
22 Chapin v. Billings, 91 Ill. 539.
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lease which antedates the mortgage, forcible entry and
detainer lies against a tenant who refuses to attorn to
the mortgagee. The reason for this is that, after notice
to the tenant of the mortgage and a demand made upon
him by the mortgagee, the tenant is bound to recognize
the mortgagee as having succeeded to the rights of the
mortgagor. By the amendment of 1881 the scope of the
action was broadened. The sixth clause of Section 2 of
the present forcible entry and detainer act in Illinois
reads in part as follows:
The person entitled to the possession of lands or tenements
may be restored thereto

.

.

.

when lands or tenements have

been conveyed by any grantor in possession, or sold under the
judgment or decree of any court in this state, or by virtue
of any sale in any mortgage or deed of trust contained, and
the grantor in possession, or party to such judgment or decree
or to such mortgage or deed of trust, after the expiration of
the time of redemption, when redemption is allowed by law,
refuses or neglects to surrender possession thereof after demand in writing by the person entitled thereto, or his agent. 23
The action of forcible detainer may, therefore, be
available, first, because the mortgagor is the grantor in
possession; second, because, after condition broken, the
legal title vests in the mortgagee who is the grantee entitled to such possession; and, third, because the grantee
or mortgagee, being entitled to possession after default,
stands in the same position as a grantee under a conveyance which is not a mortgage.
The Appellate Court in Knox v. Hunter24 attempted
to declare that if the plaintiff had not been in possession of the land or entitled to such possession prior to
the institution of the action, he could not maintain forcible entry and detainer because of the presence of the
words "may be restored thereto." The case of Aurner
v. Pierce25 was relied on by the court in its decision.
23 Cahill's III. Rev. St. 1931, Ch. 57, sec. 2.
24 150 Ill. App. 392.
25 106 Il1. App. 206.
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But this case was an action under the fifth clause and
could not control the construction of the sixth clause,
because in none of the conditions in the sixth clause could
the person entitled to the benefit of the section be construed ever to have been in possession.
26
In the case of Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Gillaom
the court held that in a forcible entry and detainer case
brought by a lessee against a lessor who refused to give
possession in accordance with the lease, it was error to
instruct the jury that the burden was on the plaintiff to
prove that it was, at some time before the commencement of the suit, in actual possession of the real estate
in question. The Appellate Court in its opinion examined the history of the development of Section 2 of the
Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. That section from
the very beginning contained the words "may be restored thereto." From time to time the legislature has
amended the section to permit the use of the action by
those merely entitled to possession, but who have never
occupied the premises. But the words "restored
thereto" remained unchanged. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly construed statutes according to the intention
of the legislature at the time the statute or amendment
was enacted. That courts will avoid a construction which
will render a provision of a statute meaningless was declared in Truly Warner Company v. Royal Indemnity
Company.27 Furthermore, a tenant holds possession
under the grantor, and his rights are no greater than
28
the rights of the grantor. In fact, in Peters v. Balke
the court in a lengthy opinion stated:
In 1881 the Legislature further extended the benefits of this
remedy to the grantee of land as against the grantor, who refuses to surrender possession. . . . Such deed must be introduced, not merely for the purpose of showing the extent
of the possession, but for the purpose of showing the plaintiff's right to the possession. In this action of forcible entry
26 256 Ill. App. 531.
27 259 Ill. App. 485.
28 170 IM. 304.
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and detainer, the question of title, as between the plaintiff
and the defendant or any one else, cannot be tried. As the
right to possession only is involved in this action, and as its
object is merely to secure possession of the premises in controversy, a judgment therein is not a bar to an action of
ejectment between the same parties regarding the same premises. . . . [The] plaintiff cannot recover under the statute
unless he offers in evidence a deed for the purpose of showing
that he is a grantee entitled to possession. . . . It has also
been held by this court, that the party entitled to the possession may bring suit, not only against the grantor who refuses
to deliver up the possession, but also against anyone who obtains possession through or under the grantor and refuses to
yield it. . . . Where a party was in possession of the land
under the maker of the trust deed, . . . such party
was to be considered as a party to the trust deed within the
meaning of clause 6, and that an action of forcible detainer
would lie against such party by the purchaser at the trustee's
sale, and that a demand upon such party is sufficient.
Where there is a tenancy at will, or by sufferance, such tenancy
is terminated by demand for possession without any notice to
quit.
It may be deduced from this opinion and from the fact
that if the mortgagee is entitled to possession, the mortgagor is regarded as a tenant at will or a quasi tenant
at will or by sufferance, 29 that the Illinois statute in regard to forcible entry and detainer is sufficiently broad
to permit the use of this action by the mortgagee in his
effort to secure possession of the mortgaged premises
when he becomes entitled thereto.
The mortgagee's right to maintain the action against
a tenant whose lease antedates the mortgage and who
does not attorn to the mortgagee after condition broken
is doubtful. But after attornment the action would lie.
In addition to the actions already mentioned for securing
possession, the mortgagee should be entitled to an action
29 41 C. J. 603.
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for use and occupation against the mortgagor and the
tenants whose tenancies are subject to the mortgage
after condition broken, and after notice and demand, in
the event that the tenants fail to attorn to the mortgagee.
The mortgagor and the tenants should be liable to the
mortgagee for a reasonable rental for the period during
which they occupied the premises thereafter.
Once the mortgagee is in possession, he owes the duty
to account to the mortgagor for the rents and profits, less
the amount paid for taxes and necessary repairs. A
senior mortgagee must protect the junior mortgagee by
applying all rents towards his own debt. He receives the
rents and profits not in his own right but as trustee or
agent for himself and the mortgagor. He cannot apply a
surplus to the liquidation of any other debts due him
from the mortgagor, except by consent of the mortgagor.
The mortgagee may make valid leases although they will
necessarily be terminated by the redemption of the mortgage unless authority to lease for a longer period be
given. He is entitled to the necessary expenses of man30
aging the estate.
It has been held that if a second mortgagee is in possession, he must apply the rents first to the first mortgage debt. But on principle, it is difficult to understand
why the first mortgagee would have a better claim 1 to
3
the rents than if the mortgagor were in possession.
If the mortgagee in possession fails to obtain the highest rent possible by, for instance, refusing to lease to
one offering the highest rent, he will be liable for this
loss if a clear case of negligence or wilful disregard of
mortgagor' s interest can be shown. He is bound to keep
the estate in good condition, but no allowance is made
for unnecessary applications of funds. He cannot improve the estate and charge it to mortgagor. However,
30 Strang et al. v. Allen, 44 Ill. 428; Moshier v. Norton, 100 Ill. 63;
Holt et al. v. Rees et al., 46 Ill. 181.
31 Crawford v. Munford, 29 Ill. App. 445; Tiedeman, An Elementary
Treatise on the American Law of Real Property (3rd Ed.), sec. 245.
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exceed the
the fact that costs for proper maintenance
32
income is no reason for not allowing them.
The mortgagee in possession will be allowed reasonable counsel fees necessary for the collection of rents
and profits, but not for suits between the mortgagee
and mortgagor. Trust deeds usually provide for attorney's fees. The mortgagee must pay the taxes and assessments necessary, and if he pays delinquent taxes
on the land he will be subrogated to the right of the state
or municipality therefor. If he be compelled to pay a
prior .lien on the property in order to protect himself,
he is entitled to recover the same out of the mortgaged
except
property. He is not entitled to compensation
33
others.
to
fees
out
pay
to
has
he
insofar as
The next important matter is the manner of distributing rents and profits received while the mortgagee
is in possession of the premises. Various rules have
been laid down as guides to the mortgagee. For example,
Tiedeman says,
In applying the rents and profits received from the estate,
the mortgagee may first deduct therefrom the expenses incurred in the management of the mortgaged premises and

then, he must apply the remainder to the liquidation of the
interest and principal of the debt in that order. If in making the account, it is ascertained that in any one period determined by the time when the interest falls due, the rents
and profits received are more than sufficient to cover the expenses and accrued interest, the balance is applied to prin-

cipal, and the interest subsequently accruing is computed on
the reduced principal. This is called making a rest, and rests
such circumstances as often as the inwill be made under
4
3
terest falls due.

32Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Mortgages of Real Property
(8th Ed.), see. 1438; Tiedeman, An Elementary Treatise on the American Law of Real Property (3rd Ed.), sec. 246; Roberts et al. v.
Fleming et al., 53 Ill. 196; Halbert v. Turner, 233 Ill. 531.
33 Strang et al. v. Allen, 44 Ill. 428; Moore v. Titman, 44 Ill. 367;
Sharp v. Thompson, 100 111. 447; Pratt v. Pratt et al., 96 Ill. 184;
Lidster v. Poole, 122 Ill. App. 227; Harper et al. v. Ely et al., 70
Ill. 581.
34Tiedeman, An Elementary Treatise on the American Law of
Real Property (3rd Ed.), sec. 270.
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Jones says that Chief Justice Shaw, in directing that
an account be reformed by making annual rests, laid
down the following rule:
"1. State the gross rents received by the defendant to the
end of the first year. 2. State the sums paid by him for repairs, taxes, and a commission for collecting the rents and
deduct the same from the gross rents and the balance will
show the net rents to the end of the year. 3. Compute the
interest on the note for one year and add to it the principal,
and the aggregate will show the amount due thereon at the
end of the year. 4. If the net annual rent exceeds the year's
interest on the note, deduct that rent from the amount due,
and the balance will show the amount due at the end of the
year. 5. At the end of the second year go through the same
process, taking the amount due at the beginning of the year as
the new capital to compute the years' interest upon. So to
the time of judgment."
Statements of substantially the same rule have frequently
been made. The two essential points are: First, that when
there is a surplus of rents in any year above the interest then
due, a rest shall be made, and the balance remaining after discharging the interest shall be applied to reduce the principal,
so that the mortgage shall not continue to draw interest for the
face of it, when in fact, the mortgagee has in his hands money
that should be applied to reduce the principal, and thereby
make the interest less for the following year. Secondly,
although the amount received in any year be insufficient to pay
the interest accrued, the surplus of interest must not be added
to the principal to swell the amount on which interest shall be
paid for the following year, for that would result in the charging of interest on interest, which is not allowed, but the interest
continues on the former principal until the receipts exceed the
interest due. These are the principles upon which the mortgagee's interest account is everywhere made up; and the cases
in which they are stated are many and in general accord.
Where there has been no application of the rents and profits to
the payment of the debt, the interest on the principal should be
computed without annual rests and the mortgagor is entitled to
interest on the rents. There should be no rest resulting in com-
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pound interest. The account should be closed annually and a
balance struck between debit and credit. If the balance is in
favor of the mortgagor the amount thereof should be applied
to a reduction of the principal.
Except for the first part of the rule, that if the annual rests
shall be made and interest allowed on the surplus, great injustice would be done in many cases.3 5 If the rents and profits
exceed the sums properly chargeable for repairs and the care of
the estate, so that there is a net surplus applicable to the payment of interest on the debt, annual rests in the computation of
interest should be made. Semi-annual rests have been allowed
where the rents and profits received quarterly were sufficient to
pay the interest. But if there is nothing received from the property that is applicable from time to time to the payment of the
accrued interest, no rests can be made. Annual rests are directed
when the mortgagee is personally in possession, as well as when
he receives rents from a tenant.
In taking the account between the mortgagee and the mortgagor the surplus of his receipts over his disbursements should
be applied to the payment of the interest as it becomes due.
.. . If in any year his disbursements exceeded his receipts the
amount of the deficit should be added to the principal of the
debt. Annual rests may be made, so that the mortgagor may be
charged with interest for disbursements made by the mortgagee, but not so as to charge the debtor with compound interest
either upon the mortgage or upon the advances.
According to the English decisions, if there is interest in arrear
at the time the mortgagee takes possession, annual rests are not
generally required until the interest in arrear is paid off or even
30
until the whole mortgage debt is paid off.
In the case of Moshier v. Norton et al.,'3 7 decided in
1881, the court upheld the account as prepared by the
master in which the account was stated annually, and
refused to recognize the contention that inasmuch as
35 Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Mortgages of Real Property
(8th Ed.), sec. 1456.
36 Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Mortgages of Real Property
(8th Ed.), sec. 1457.

37 100 Ill. 63.
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interest was in arrears at the time the mortgagee took
possession that the mortgagee did not have to state his
account annually but could wait until his entire debt was
paid off. An examination of the case indicates that
the master was inconsistent in his accounting. For
a period of several years during which the mortgagee
was in possession, the master computed the interest
accrued and the rents received and applied the rent
first in the payment of interest and then, on principal, and thereafter stated the account annually. The
rent received each year was more than sufficient to
pay the interest accrued and the general taxes. Therefore, it would seem that the case is not necessarily
authority for requiring the mortgagee in possession
to state his account annually in the event that the
rents were not sufficient to pay the entire interest which
has accrued, together with taxes. The present day
problem seems to be more complicated than in 1881 because of the diverse ownership of the indebtedness secured by the trust deed. The various rules for stating
an account have been set forth herein at length in order
to show the wide divergence of the authorities.
The main purpose of stating an account at intervals
seems to be to apply as much of the income
as is possible toward the payment of the principal
of the indebtedness. It is a question whether or not
a mortgagee in possession can add to the principal
indebtedness the deficiency of receipts over disbursements and thereby become entitled to interest on such
deficiency. Because of the varying conditions surrounding each particular case it is doubted that a general rule
can be laid down as a guide to mortgagees in possession.
Fortunately, most of the trust deeds provide the manner
of applying rents and, where this is so, the mortgagee is
safe in following the directions; in fact, if he does not,
he may be personally liable because of the misapplication
of funds which he has undertaken to administer.
One of the first things a mortgagee should do is to
become acquainted with the terms and conditions of the
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trust deed. The trust deed may restrict or amplify the
general law with reference to the rights of the mortgagee
in the instant trust deed. If he violates the terms and
conditions of the particular trust deed he may become
personally liable not only to the security holders, but
also to the mortgagor. If, however, he follows the letter
of the trust deed, where it speaks, and the common law
as interpreted by the courts in Illinois, where it does
not speak, the mortgagee will generally be protected,
and in taking possession of the property he will greatly
benefit the security holders.
The right of a mortgagee to continue in possession
after foreclosure sale for the purpose of collecting rents
and profits to apply toward the payment of the deficiency
decree is not so well established in law as is the right to
enter for condition broken. In several recent cases,
chancellors have entered decrees approving distribution
and sale, and have provided that the mortgagee continue
in possession of the premises subject to accounting to the
court for the rents received and the application made
thereof. It would seem that it is as much within the
jurisdiction of the court to continue the mortgagee in
possession for the purpose of collecting rents to apply
on the deficiency as to appoint a receiver for this purpose. Under the right of a mortgagee in possession to
continue in possession until the entire debt is paid, and
under the pledge to the mortgagee of the rents, issues,
and profits as security for the payment of the indebtedness, it might even be said that the court is bound to
recognize the right of the mortgagee to enter into possession for the purpose of collecting the deficiency, or to
continue in possession until the debt is paid. Care should
be exercised in incorporating in the decree as many of
the provisions of the trust deed regarding the matter
of the trustee's rights to possession as possible, in order
that these rights might carry over after the trust deed
has become merged in the decree.
Whether or not a mortgagee, or trustee, is authorized
in Illinois to purchase the property at the foreclosure
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sale on behalf of all of the security holders without presenting the securities at the time of the sale or making
proof of the ownership thereof, is an interesting question
for the consideration of those who are seeking a method
to bring order out of the chaos that frequently exists
in the case of large issues. Inasmuch as this question is
not properly a part of the subject matter of this discussion, it should only be considered as a suggestion for further thought. In the case of a large hotel in Chicago this
procedure was followed and apparently with success.
Foreclosures could be handled with greater expedition,
with smaller master's fees and without the necessity of
a bondholders' protective committee and without the
necessity of providing for non-depositing bondholders,
if the mortgagee could and would purchase the property
at the sale on behalf of all the bondholders and then continue to represent the security holders in accordance with
their respective interests until such time as the property
is redeemed or is sold by the trustee.
Fully to appreciate the extent that the courts have
gone in protecting the rights of a mortgagee with reference to the possession of the property, we need but examine the decision of the Appellate Court in In re Petition
of Chicago Trust Company.38 In this well reasoned opinion the court upheld the right of a trustee under a first
mortgage to take the possession of the property from a
receiver appointed under a second mortgage. This recent decision removes all question of the present right of
a mortgagee to take possession of property in case of
condition broken and should remove all doubt of the
efficacy of this remedy.
3s 264 Il.

App. 106.

